Maryland Law Review
Volume 75 | Issue 3

Article 3

Natural Baselines for Wildfire Takings Claims
Justin Pidot

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons
Recommended Citation
75 Md. L. Rev. 698 (2016)

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

NATURAL BASELINES FOR WILDFIRE TAKINGS CLAIMS
JUSTIN PIDOT ∗
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a forest that burns every ten years like clockwork. Someone
acquires a ten acre parcel within the forest, and, three years after the last
fire, builds a small cabin. Imagine also that there is a chemical that can be
sprayed on the forest that will prevent it from burning for three years, but
that after three years, the chemical will itself ignite, causing a wildfire. In
year nine, the government sprays the forest with the chemical. No fire
occurs in year ten, but, as expected, the chemical deployed by the
government ignites in year twelve, burning the forest and the small cabin.
This stylized story reveals the puzzle of wildfire takings claims, and to
a degree, takings claims that arise out of other natural disasters like
flooding. In one sense, the government action—spraying the chemical—
destroyed the cabin. After all, the government deployed the chemical and
the chemical directly caused the fire; in legal terms, the spraying of the
chemical appears to be the “but for” cause of the damage suffered by the
property owner. At the same time, in the absence of the government’s
action, the cabin would have been destroyed anyway—indeed, it would
have been destroyed sooner. The government is, thus, both the cause of the
fire that destroyed the cabin and simultaneously the cause of the
landowner’s reprieve.
Reality mirrors this story of sprayed chemicals and burnt cabins
because most of the wildlands across the country in which development
occurs burn in their natural state with reasonable frequency and
predictability. While no chemical exists with the properties I have
described, the government has long taken steps to ameliorate the risk that
wildfires will start, and to extinguish and manage wildfires when they burn.
Such efforts may delay the inevitable, but wildfire always returns, and in
many circumstances the delayed blaze may burn with greater intensity and
more destructive force. 1
© 2016 Justin Pidot.
∗ Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author would like
to thank Cheyenne Moore for her excellent work as his research assistant and extend his gratitude
to John Echeverria and all of the participants in the 18th Annual Conference on Litigating Takings
Challenges to Land Use and Environmental Regulations.
1. See Robert B. Keiter, The Law of Fire: Reshaping Public Land Policy in an Era of
Ecology and Litigation, 36 ENVTL. L. 301, 314–15 (2006).
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The dynamics at play are important ones, because people increasingly
live and work in locations subject to the risk that wildfire will destroy
buildings, ravage landscapes, and, in extreme cases, claim lives.2
Development in fire-prone regions of the United States, often referred to as
the Wildland-Urban Interface (“WUI”), is explosive. 3 People flock to these
areas because they are beautiful, are located near natural amenities, and
land prices may be less expensive than those available in urban cores.4
Development also occurs, at least in part, because private property
owners do not bear many of the economic costs associated with wildfire
risk. The government—and in particular the federal government—
consistently subsidizes development in locations facing natural disaster risk,
and wildfire is no exception. 5 Federal taxpayers invest heavily in managing
natural ecosystems to reduce fire risk, and, when wildfires ignite, federal
taxpayers (and to some extent state and local taxpayers) fund efforts to
control and quench wildfires. 6 Public and private disaster relief also
ameliorates the direct economic consequences property owners experience
from wildfires. 7
The hefty price tag associated with wildfire prevention, response, and
recovery activities—to the tune of billions of dollars per year8—directly
2. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-427T, WILDLAND FIRE
MANAGEMENT: LACK OF A COHESIVE STRATEGY HINDERS AGENCIES’ COST-CONTAINMENT
EFFORTS 4 (2007) (“Experts estimate that between 1990 and 2000, 60 percent of all new housing
units in the United States were built in the wildland-urban interface.”); Wildland Fire Fatalities by
Year, NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., https://www.nifc.gov/safety/safety_documents/Fatalitiesby-Year.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
3. See SEBASTIÁN MARTINUZZI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE 2010 WILDLANDURBAN INTERFACE OF THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 8 (2015); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., USDA/OIG-A 08601-44SF WESTERN REGION, AUDIT REPORT:
FOREST SERVICE LARGE FIRE SUPPRESSION COSTS 6 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
AUDIT REPORT].
4. MARTINUZZI ET AL., supra note 3, at 12.
5. See, e.g., Justin Pidot, Deconstructing Disaster, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 213, 251 (2013).
6. See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT: FEDERAL
AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN IMPORTANT STEPS FORWARD, BUT ADDITIONAL, STRATEGIC ACTION IS
NEEDED TO CAPITALIZE ON THOSE STEPS 5 (2009) [hereinafter GAO, IMPORTANT STEPS] (noting
that Congress appropriated an average of $3.1 billion for wildland fire expenditures by the U.S.
Forest Service and agencies within the Department of Interior between 2001 and 2007); see also
Benjamin Reilly, Note, Free Riders on the Firestorm: How Shifting the Costs of Wildfire
Management to Residents of the Wildland-Urban Interface Will Benefit Our Public Forests, 42
B.C. J. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 541 (2015); Garrett D. Trego, Note, We Didn’t Start the Fire . . . and
We Won’t Pay to Stop It: Financing Wildfire Management in America’s Wildland-Urban
Interface, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 595, 596 (2012).
7. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Federal Disaster Assistance
Tops $6 Million: California Wildfire Recovery Is Underway (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2015/10/08/federal-disaster-assistance-tops-6-millioncalifornia-wildfire-recovery; Southern California Wildfire Relief Fund, CALIFORNIA CMTY.
FOUND., http://calfund.org/wildfire-relief-fund/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2015); cf. Pidot, supra note
5, at 248–49 (discussing private disaster relief).
8. Keiter, supra note 1, at 311.
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benefits private property owners. Therefore, investments in the built
environment appear economically rational from the perspective of a private
landowner, because the costs imposed by wildfire risk are significantly
displaced onto the general public. 9 While such subsidies do not avoid the
genuine and often acute feelings of personal loss experienced by those
whose homes are destroyed by wildfire—money from the government does
not make an individual who has lost their home and all it contains feel
whole—they may mute the effect that wildfire risk has on property value. 10
Cognitive biases also affect perceptions of wildfire risk and these biases
may further suppress the effect of risk on the market price of property. 11
Individuals whose property has suffered damage from wildfires
predictably sue the government, seeking compensation under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 12 although the doctrine of wildfire takings
is much less mature than that related to other disasters such as flooding
because there have been relatively fewer lawsuits. Following the Supreme
Court’s lead in other areas of takings law, recent lower court decisions
have, however, resisted a categorical approach to addressing wildfire
takings claims. 13 In so doing, these courts have adopted what I will refer to
as an “incident-centric approach” to wildfire takings claims. Under this
approach, analysis of the takings claim centers on the specifics of the
wildfire incident that caused harm to the property. 14 The incident-centric
approach, at its extreme, would mean that the owner of the cabin in my
opening story could recover compensation from the government because
the chemical deployed by the government caused the fire. This approach is
in contrast to what I will refer to as a “baseline-centric” approach to
wildfire takings claims in which analysis of the takings claim centers on

9. Carolyn Kousky & Sheila M. Olmstead, Induced Development in Risky Locations: Fire
Suppression and Land Use in the American West 4 (unpublished manuscript) (June 22, 2012)
(cited with permission; on file with author).
10. Id. at 239. The personal nature of natural disasters, and the losses they threaten, is
underscored by estimates that thousands of people refused to evacuate New Orleans prior to
Hurricane Katrina because they did not have a means of also evacuating their pets. See William
Brangham, How Did Katrina Change How We Evacuate Pets from Disaster?, PBS NEWSHOUR
BLOG (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/hurricane-katrina-change-wayevacuate-pets-devastation/.
11. See Pidot, supra note 5, at 235–43.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a discussion of the evolution of takings doctrine, see Justin
R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 41 ECOL. L.Q. 131, 139–42 (2014) and
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
13. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 521–22 (2012)
(“We rule today, simply and only, that government-induced flooding temporary in duration gains
no automatic exemption from Takings Clause inspection.”); TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 722
F.3d 1375, 1378–80 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
14. See, e.g., TrinCo Inv. Co., 722 F.3d at 1377–80; Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373,
1376–81 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Teegarden v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 252, 256–58 (1998).
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baseline risk of wildfire to which a parcel of property is subject.15 Under
this approach, the cabin owner could not recover because under natural
conditions the cabin would inevitably burn.
As this Essay will explain, one consequence of the incident-centric
approach currently popular with courts is that cases may not be subject to
early disposition, requiring courts and government agencies to expend
substantial resources on factually intensive inquiries into exactly what
occurred during the course of a wildfire. Moreover, these inquiries are
themselves often fraught because wildfire response can be chaotic and
rapidly evolving.
The stylized story at the beginning of this Essay perhaps also reveals
my own perspective on how such claims should be treated. When people
build within wildlands that naturally burn, they act (or at least, should act)
in full knowledge of the inevitability of wildfire. The government, then,
does not unsettle those expectations when a wildfire occurs, regardless of
whether a governmental act was the immediate cause of that wildfire. Nor
should the government be viewed as the legal cause of the damage to the
property. The damage was bound to happen—the government at most
influenced the timing, and, as a general matter, the government’s efforts
have provided the property owner with more time to enjoy and make use of
their property than that owner would have experienced had the forest been
left unmanaged. 16
Viewed in this light, the prospect of requiring the government to
compensate a landowner when wildfire management efforts result in
damage to private property is both doctrinally indefensible and bad policy.
Such a compensation award is nothing short of a direct subsidy for building
in fire-prone locations, increasing development and the attendant losses
suffered when wildfires occur.
This Essay advocates for rejecting the incident-centric approach in
favor of a baseline-centric approach. It does so in three Parts. Part I
provides an overview of naturally occurring wildfire risk and development
activities in risky locations. Part II provides an overview of wildfire takings
claims, identifying avenues for conceptualizing these claims and discussing
three cases in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or
15. Cf. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522 (identifying as relevant to takings
inquiry flooded lands that “had not been exposed to flooding comparable” to that which served as
the basis of the claim for compensation). While the Supreme Court’s Arkansas Game decision
does not entirely adopt a baseline-centric approach to the takings question, it did consider the
environmental baseline a relevant factor.
16. Philip E. Higuera et al., Fire-Regime Complacency and Sensitivity to Centennial—
Through Millennial—Scale Climate Change in Rocky Mountain Subalpine Forests, Colorado,
USA, 102 J. ECOL. 1429, 1429–30 (2014); Feng Zhao et al., Comparing Historical and Current
Wildfire Regimes in the Northern Rocky Mountains Using a Landscape Succession Model, 343
FOREST ECOL. & MGMT. 9, 19 (2015). While forest management efforts typically reduce the
frequency of wildfire, they may result in great intensity when a fire occurs. Id.
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the United States Court of Federal Claims that have resolved such claims.
Part II also reveals that courts have, to date, adopted an incident-centric
approach to wildfire takings cases. Part III identifies problems with the
current approach and then provides a doctrinal and policy justification for
shifting to a baseline-centric approach.
Taking baseline risks seriously, as this Essay suggests courts should
do, will have salutary effects both on government wildfire response and on
development practices. While those owning property damaged in wildfires
may prove sympathetic plaintiffs in some cases, creating a system that
further encourages development in wildfire-prone locations will only
expand the vulnerability of people and the built environment to this natural
risk and simultaneously tax federal coffers.
I. THE CONTEXT OF WILDFIRE TAKINGS CLAIMS
Wildfire is a ubiquitous feature of natural landscapes. Prior to
significant human development, ecosystems across the United States
routinely combusted, with lightning strikes providing the spark to cause
ignition.17 As Stephen Pyne wrote: “[e]lectrical fire operated on the earth’s
surface as soon as an atmosphere evolved and vegetation appeared.”18
While wildfire is inevitable in nature, its frequency and severity differs
across ecosystems. 19 Historically, some ecosystems, such as most of the
forest types in the southeastern United States and ponderosa pine forests in
the southwestern United States, experienced high frequency wildfires that
would return every few years; such fires were generally of a low intensity
and only cleared forest understory, rarely proving fatal to mature trees.20
Other forest ecosystems experienced more intense wildfires on the order of
every few decades, and such fires were more likely to constitute stand
clearing events. 21
Even in the absence of human development and forest management,
climate change likely affects the natural baseline frequency of wildfires. In
general, climate change increases wildfire risk, making wildfires more
frequent by lengthening fire seasons, rendering forests more susceptible to
disease infestation, and generally increasing moisture loss.22 As average

17. STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WILDLAND AND RURAL
FIRE 8 (1982).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 35, 38; see Keiter, supra note 1, at 314.
20. See Richard P. Guyette, Predicting Fire Frequency with Chemistry and Climate, 15
ECOSYSTEMS 322, 330 (2012) (mapping fire frequency from 1650–1850); see also Reilly, supra
note 6, at 546.
21. See Guyette, supra note 20.
22. See JAMES FUNK ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN FORESTS AT RISK: CONFRONTING
CLIMATE-DRIVEN IMPACTS FROM INSECTS, WILDFIRES, HEAT AND DROUGHT 3–4 (2014); see

2016]

NATURAL BASELINES FOR WILDFIRE TAKINGS CLAIMS

703

temperatures rise, historic baseline conditions will generally underestimate
the frequency of wildfires in the absence of any human intervention.
With only a few exceptions, most ecosystems experience a natural fire
cycle of sufficient frequency so as to be of consequence to human
development. 23 In other words, the natural baseline wildfire regime within
natural landscapes is such that improvements on property would be
damaged by wildfire, irrespective of human intervention, within the life
expectancy of those improvements. This state of intermittent wildfire in the
absence of human intervention serves as a baseline against which the effects
of human activities—and of particular import for this Essay, government
activities—should be assessed.
Over the last century, government agencies, particularly land
management agencies of the federal government, have been heavily
involved in managing forests and responding to wildfires. For decades, the
Federal Government adopted an aggressive fire suppression policy designed
to squelch wildfires as soon as they arose.24 This policy was effective;
between 1946 and 1978, wildfires burned less than half the number of acres
as had burned in earlier years. 25 While scientists and policymakers now
agree that this robust wildfire suppression policy had negative ecological
consequences and allowed fuel loads of dry timber and brush to build,
increasing fire risk over time, 26 it is difficult to dispute that this policy
allowed those owning private property within wildlands to enjoy a longer
fire-free period than they would have enjoyed in the absence of government
intervention.
As we now know, efforts at containment and suppression cannot
postpone wildfire indefinitely. 27 Developing property within wildlands is
therefore a risky business.
Houses, businesses, and other built
infrastructure face an ongoing risk of wildfire and the inevitable reality of
that risk materializing. Nonetheless, an increasing number of people
choose to live and work in these locations. 28 In 2010, about ten percent of
also Karen M. Bradshaw, A Modern Overview of Wildfire Law, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV.
445, 450 (2010).
23. See Guyette, supra note 20, at 328–29. Some desert ecosystems, for example, may have
a natural wildfire frequency so low that it is essentially irrelevant for purposes of evaluating
human endeavors. Id.
24. See, e.g., Keiter, supra note 1, at 306–08.
25. Id. at 307; see also GAO, IMPORTANT STEPS, supra note 6, at 3; Jamison Colburn, The
Fire Next Time: Land Use Planning in the Wildland/Urban Interface, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 223, 225–26 (2008).
26. Keiter, supra note 1, at 308–11.
27. Michael P. Dombeck et al., Wildfire Policy and Public Lands: Integrating Scientific
Understanding with Social Concerns Across Landscapes, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 883, 885
(2004).
28. See Colburn, supra note 25, at 240 (noting that development in the WUI “is actually the
fastest growing category of real estate in America”).
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the territory of the United States fell within the WUI, defined as “the area
where structures and other human development meet or intermingle with
undeveloped wildland.” 29 At that time, the WUI was estimated to contain
approximately one-third of residential houses in the country, 30 and the
Department of Agriculture estimates that the number of houses within the
WUI of the Rocky Mountains will increase forty percent between 2006 and
2030. 31
Humans have extensively settled areas with a significant baseline risk
of wildfire and continue to do so. Part of the reason for this is, of course,
that living in wildlands confers many benefits, and for some people the
opportunity to live in a beautiful location with easy access to outdoor
recreation may outweigh the risk of losing personal possessions to
wildfire. 32 As the price of housing in urban cores has increased, more rural
locations have also become increasingly attractive to prospective
homebuyers. 33
The market incentive for developers to build homes and other
infrastructure in wildlands, and for individuals to live and work in these
regions, is heightened by government policies that subsidize development
in hazardous areas and cognitive biases that cause individuals to discount
disaster risk in making decisions, thereby depressing the market signal that
disaster risk would otherwise send. 34 Such government subsidies are
perverse because they not only place people and infrastructure in harm’s
way, but also create incentives for development that displaces open space
and accompanying environmental, recreational, and aesthetic public
benefits. 35 This is a lose-lose proposition: more development is placed at
29. MARTINUZZI ET AL., supra note 3, at 7, 12; see also V.C. Radeloff et al., The WildlandUrban Interface in the United States, 15 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 799 (2005). Buildings
within the WUI are at risk of harm from wildfire, and the Departments of Agriculture and Interior
defines a community within the WUI as one that “exists where humans and their development
meet or intermix with wildland fuel.” Department of Agriculture & Department of the Interior,
Urban Wildland Interface Communities Within the Vicinity of Federal Lands That Are at High
Risk from Wildfire, 66 Fed. Reg. 751, 752–53 (Jan. 4, 2001). By definition, the WUI does not
capture all development at risk from wildfire because building density must exceed one structure
per forty acres to qualify. See MARTINUZZI ET AL., supra note 3, at 9.
30. See MARTINUZZI ET AL., supra note 3, at 14.
31. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT, supra note 3. This trend is not new. Between
1990 and 2000, the population within Colorado’s “‘forest fringe’— land within 1 kilometer of
forested land cover—grew at a whopping 4.6 percent annually.” Federico Cheever, The Phantom
Menace and the Real Cause: Lessons from Colorado’s Hayman Fire 2002, 18 PENN ST. ENVTL.
L. REV. 185, 193 (2010).
32. See, e.g., MARTINUZZI ET AL., supra note 3, at 12; Colburn, supra note 25, at 241 (“There
is a commonly expressed preference for residences proximate to landscapes which look and feel
like nature in a ‘wild’ state.”).
33. MARTINUZZI ET AL., supra note 3, at 12.
34. See, e.g., Bradshaw, supra note 22, at 463–65.
35. See, e.g., Steverson O. Moffat & John L. Greene, Economic and Tax Issues, in HUMAN
INFLUENCES ON FOREST ECOSYSTEMS: THE SOUTHERN WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE
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greater risk resulting in ever-increasing economic losses all while
consuming irreplaceable natural amenities. As will be discussed below,
recognizing a robust takings remedy for those whose private property is
damaged or destroyed by wildfire creates yet another subsidy for this riskseeking behavior. To understand the risks adherent in such a takings
subsidy, consider the ill effects created by subsidies that already exist.
Subsidies for development in areas subject to fire risks take several
forms. First, managers of publicly owned forests expend substantial
resources in an effort (not always successful) to mitigate and reduce
wildfire risks. 36 Second, the government invests heavily in wildfire
response. In 2015, the United States Forest Service spent more than $1
billion on programs related to wildfires, which was more than half of its
budget for that year. 37 By 2025, the agency expects the cost of wildfire
programs to exceed $1.8 billion. 38 Third, disaster assistance programs
provide significant funding for those whose businesses or property are
harmed by wildfires. 39 Unlike with other natural disasters, few wildfires are
declared major disasters by the federal government, which means that
relatively little assistance under the Stafford Act is available to those who
lose homes and businesses due to wildfire. 40 Wild-fire related disaster
declarations do, however, occur. For example, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (“FEMA”) provided nearly $1.3 million in federal
disaster assistance to Montana following a wildfire that occurred during the

ASSESSMENT 37, 40 (Edward A. Macie & L. Annie Hermansen eds., 2002) (identifying the rate of
open space converted to development in the southern United States); R. Bruce Hull & Susan I.
Stewart, Social Consequences of Change, in HUMAN INFLUENCES ON FOREST ECOSYSTEMS: THE
SOUTHERN WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE ASSESSMENT 115, 123 (“The once unbroken forested
horizon is now dotted with houses and street lights.”); see also Colburn, supra note 25, at 223.
36. For a history of federal wildfire management program, see Keiter, supra note 1, at 304–
13.
37. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., THE RISING COST OF WILDFIRE OPERATIONS:
EFFECTS
ON
THE
FOREST
SERVICE’S
NON-FIRE
WORK
5
(2015),
http://www.fs.fed.us/sites/default/files/2015-Fire-Budget-Report.pdf [hereinafter U.S. FOREST
SERV. REPORT].
38. Id.
39. See CAROLYN V. TORSELL & JARED C. NAGEL, FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE
RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PROGRAMS: BRIEF SUMMARIES 2, 4, 10–12 (2015) (identifying
federal disaster assistance programs for individuals, families, and small businesses).
40. According to the website of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”),
which is charged with managing disaster declarations, see About the Agency, FED. EMERGENCY
MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/about-agency (last visited Jan. 18, 2016), wildfires have
resulted in six major disaster declarations and four emergency declarations since 2000. Disaster
Declarations, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/disasters (select disaster
type “Fire” and declaration type “Major Disaster Declaration” and “Emergency Declaration”) (last
visited Jan. 18, 2016). FEMA also manages a grant program to aid in fire management, but that
program provides funding for “mitigation, management, and control of fires,” instead of disaster
assistance. Fire Management Assistance Grant Program, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
https://www.fema.gov/fire-management-assistance-grant-program (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
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summer of 2012. 41 Both state and philanthropic programs also provide
substantial disaster relief. 42
Financial subsidies conceal the true economic cost of developing
within fire-prone forests. 43
By artificially reducing the cost of
development, subsidies make it economically rational to build more homes
and businesses. Non-economic factors also skew perceptions of fire risk.
Researchers have identified an array of cognitive biases that can lead to a
systematic underappreciation of natural disaster risks. 44 The human brain
tends to do a poor job accurately comprehending low likelihood, high
severity risks. 45 Additionally, because of the so-called “affect heuristic,”
our brains also tend to view things that we like as relatively safe. 46 This
means that a prospective buyer who falls in love with a home nestled in the
woods will likely discount the risk that those woods may burn. People also
fall prey to the gambler’s fallacy, which suggests once an unlikely event
occurs, it is less likely to occur a second time. 47 The availability heuristic
may also skew risk perception: this mental shortcut leads people to estimate
risks based on the ease with which they can think of examples of that risk
manifesting, a poor means of conceptualizing the likelihood of relatively
rare events. 48 Thus, inherent characteristics of human cognition can cause
individuals to undervalue the risks associated with wildfire, thereby
cloaking economically irrational decisions to invest in infrastructure in fireprone locations in an illusion of rationality.
The operation of these cognitive errors and shortcuts on development
is not just theoretical. Studies of the effect of wildfires on housing prices
confirm that cognitive biases play a significant role in risk perceptions and
concomitant property valuation.
Property values suffer in areas
immediately adjacent to recent wildfires, but otherwise remain stable in the
region, demonstrating what researchers have referred to as an “‘out of sight,
out of mind’ mentality.” 49 The effect suggests that the availability heuristic,

41. See Montana Wildfires, (DR-4074) FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
https://www.fema.gov/disaster/4074 (select “Financial Assistance”) (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
42. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA CMTY. FOUND., supra note 7.
43. See Bradshaw, supra note 22, at 464–65.
44. See Pidot, supra note 5, at 235–43.
45. See, e.g., Howard Kunreauther et al., Making Low Probabilities Useful, 23 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 103 (2001).
46. See Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits,
13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 2 (2000).
47. See Stephen P. Stich & Richard E. Nisbett, Justification and the Psychology of Human
Reasoning, 47 PHIL. SCI. 199, 192–93 (1980); see Pidot, supra note 5, at 238–39.
48. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 711–12 (1999); see also Pidot, supra note 5, at 239–40.
49. See Winslow D. Hansen et al., Wildfire in Hedonic Property Value Studies, 13 WESTERN
ECON. F. 23, 27–28 (2014) (citing K.M. Stetler et al., The Effects of Wildfire and Environmental
Amenities on Property Values in Northwest Montana, USA, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2233, 2241–
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and particularly the salience of wildfire to prospective homebuyers, skews
risk perceptions, despite the fact that areas proximate to recent wildfires
may be no more at risk (and potentially at less risk) than areas in similar
ecological settings further from recent fire activity. 50
The various mechanisms that distort incentives to develop in the WUI
provide a backdrop for the consideration of wildfire takings claims.
Wildfires are a natural and ubiquitous element of natural ecosystems;
nonetheless, development of such ecosystems occurs at a dramatic pace,
increasing the vulnerability of the built infrastructure to wildfires, and
property values and development decisions do not adequately reflect
wildfire risk because of government subsidies and cognitive biases. These
dynamics reinforce one another. As more construction occurs within the
WUI, the economic value of the built environment threatened by wildfire
will increase, as will the demand for governmental activities to minimize
fire risk and suppress wildfires once ignited.
II. DIMENSIONS OF WILDFIRE TAKINGS
An increasing number of people owning increasingly valuable
property in wildfire-prone locales will predictably lead to an increasing
amount of litigation in the wake of wildfires. Some of this litigation will
involve private property owners seeking compensation from the
government under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. 51 This class of
cases—wildfire takings claims—has yet to achieve the maturity of other
areas of takings law. Relatively few cases have been brought and, until
recently, the government has been successful in defeating claims at an early
stage. 52 But a recent preliminary victory for a property owner in a wildfire
takings case, 53 along with related successes in the context of takings claims
related to flooding, 54 suggests that this is likely to be a burgeoning field.
This Section begins by considering two approaches that courts could
take to wildfire takings claims: the incident-centric approach and the
42 (2010)). Winslow Hansen and his collaborators identify studies in a number of states finding
that property values decline if property is in proximity to recent wildfire events. Id.
50. A wildfire will diminish the risk of a second wildfire in the area to the extent that it
consumes excess fuels that contributed to wildfire risk.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause provides “nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.” Id. While the Takings Clause was originally
understood only to require compensation in circumstances where government directly
appropriated private property, see Pidot, supra note 12, at 140, the Supreme Court has recognized
that government activities that do not constitute direct appropriations can also trigger an obligation
to pay compensation. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
52. See, e.g., Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Teegarden v. United
States, 42 Fed. Cl. 252 (1998). In both Cary and Teegarden, the government filed a successful
motion to dismiss.
53. TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
54. See, e.g., St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015).
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baseline-centric approach. It then examines three cases decided by either
the Federal Circuit or the Court of Federal Claims, each of which adopted
an incident-centric approach to the wildfire takings claims at issue.
A. Theoretical Approaches
In general terms, courts could frame wildfire takings claims in one of
two ways. First, the court could consider the natural setting involved,
taking particular account of a property’s baseline wildfire risk, and whether,
as a result of that naturally occurring risk, wildfire is an expected hazard in
the ecosystem. Second, the court could consider the particular wildfire that
caused damage, the governmental action alleged to have caused or
contributed to that wildfire, and any potential justification for that action.
As I have already explained, the vast majority of ecosystems
experience naturally occurring wildfires of reasonable frequency—on the
order of years or decades.55 In these wildlands—let us call them fire-prone
wildlands—it may be impossible to predict precisely when a fire will occur,
but we can predict with virtual assurance that a fire will occur eventually.
A few ecosystems—such as certain desert ecosystems—experience
extremely infrequent wildfires. The floor of Death Valley, for example, is
predicted to experience wildfire only once in a several millennia. 56 While
these ecosystems—let us call them fire-poor wildlands—are rare, the
difference in natural baseline risk would feature prominently in the analysis
of a takings claim under a baseline-centric approach. 57 A court might
distinguish between baseline conditions under which that owner should
reasonably foresee wildfire damaging her property—where property lies
within a fire-prone wildland—and baseline conditions that indicate that an
owner should not reasonably foresee such damage—where property lies
within a fire-poor wildland.
A court considering baseline wildfire frequency would need to
understand the natural setting of a plaintiff’s private property. Such an
assessment would only require inquiry into background biological facts and
would not involve consideration of the cause of the precise fire that harmed
a plaintiff’s property or the nature of the governmental response.58 In other
words, this potential framing of a wildfire takings claim focuses on risk of
wildfire rather than the events surrounding any singular wildfire that occurs.
While there are numerous reasons to believe that baseline wildfire risk
55. See supra notes 15–21 & accompanying text.
56. See Guyette, supra note 20, at 328–29.
57. C.f. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 (2012) (noting that
plaintiffs’ property “had not been exposed to [comparable] flooding” prior to the government
action alleged to have caused a compensable taking).
58. See supra notes 19–23 & accompanying text for a discussion of baseline biological facts
related to wildfire frequency.
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should be relevant, or even dispositive, of a takings claim—as will be
discussed below—courts have not yet placed analytic weight on this facet
of a wildfire takings claim.
Instead of utilizing this baseline-centric approach, a court could utilize
the incident-centric approach and analyze the specifics of the particular
wildfire that caused harm to a plaintiff’s property, and this is the approach
that courts have tended to adopt. While there are myriad activities that the
government could undertake related to a wildfire, let me identify four rough
categories of government action that could be implicated in a wildfire
takings claim. Category One: the government manages a public wildlands
and a plaintiff alleges that management (or alleged mismanagement)
increased the risk of fire. Category Two: the government ignites a
controlled burn to reduce fire risk and that controlled burn—either
inadvertently or intentionally—spreads to private land. Category Three: the
government actively responds to a wildfire but its response does not protect
the plaintiff’s property. Category Four: the government actively responds
to a wildfire, and as part of its response ignites a backfire to consume fuel
in the wildfire’s path, intentionally burning the plaintiff’s property. 59
A focus on the specifics of a particular wildfire may also require a
court to consider the government’s justification for its action. The
government could, for example, justify its action as a necessary response to
an exigent circumstance, invoking the so-called “public necessity” defense,
which is a longstanding hallmark of property law.60 Government could also
assert that a particular government action was necessary to mitigate a
significant risk. 61

59. The U.S. Forest Service defines a backfire as “[a] fire set along the inner edge of a
fireline to consume the fuel in the path of a wildfire and/or change the direction of force of the
FOREST
SERV.,
fire’s
convection
column.”
Fire
Terminology,
USDA
http://www.fs.fed.us/nwacfire/home/terminology.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
60. See, e.g., TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Daniel
H. Owsley, Note, TrinCo and Actual Necessity: Has the Federal Circuit Provided the Tinder to
Burn Down the Public Necessity Defense in Wildfire Takings Cases?, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 373 (2014–2015). The Supreme Court recognized the common law defense of public
necessity in Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1879), a case that involved the
destruction of a building to contain a fire in Boston. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S.
1003, 1029 n.16 (1992) (identifying as a background principle of law the rule that “absolv[es] the
State (or private parties) of liability for the destruction of ‘real and personal property, in cases of
actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire’”).
61. The government could, in other words, argue that it took action to abate a public
nuisance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 202 (1965) (“A public officer who by virtue
of his office or by statute is authorized to abate a public nuisance, is privileged, at a reasonable
time and in a reasonable manner, to enter land in the possession of another for the purpose of
abating such a nuisance.”). The Supreme Court has suggested that the common law of nuisance,
which authorizes abatement actions, constitutes a background principle of state law that, if
properly invoked, can immunize the government from the obligation to pay compensation. See
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (noting that a “confiscatory regulation[]” would not require compensation
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Courts have taken this latter course and focused on the specific
incident attendant to a wildfire and the government’s justification for any
response it undertook, both issues which may require a searching inquiry
into the specific facts of a particular wildfire and wildfire response. That
does not mean that a plaintiff will prevail and secure compensation, but
such an inquiry imposes significant litigation expense on the government
and may create incentives for settlement. The baseline-centric approach, on
the other hand, requires much less factual development and, if viewed as
dispositive, could allow for early resolution of cases in the government’s
favor. As I will discuss below, as a matter of doctrine and policy, takings
claims should not be permitted for those owning land in fire-prone
wildlands, and such a shift in focus would have the side benefit of reducing
the judicial and litigation resources needed to resolve these claims.
B. Wildfire Takings Cases
The Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit have handled
three wildfire takings claims worthy of consideration. 62 The first two
cases—Cary v. United States 63 and Teegarden v. United States 64—represent
what may be an old paradigm for wildfire takings cases: one in which the
government prevails with relative ease and without significant factual
development of the record. The third case—TrinCo Investment Co. v.
United States 65—represents what may be a new paradigm that permits
plaintiffs to force discovery related to government decisionmaking
processes. These three cases not only demonstrate disparate approaches to
takings claims, but they also cut across the categories of government action
identified above, falling within Category One—forest management
activities, Category Three—failure to protect property during active
wildfire response, and Category Four—engaging in backburning that
damages private property as part of active wildfire response.66 In both the
if it coincides with “the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership”).
62. These two courts have exclusive jurisdiction over takings claims brought against the
United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012) (waiving sovereign immunity of the United
States for monetary claims seeking damages in excess of $10,000 so long as the complaint is
brought in the Court of Federal Claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2012) (providing the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals taken from U.S. Court
of Federal Claims); Justin R. Pidot, Eroding the Parcel, 39 VT. L. REV. 647, 655 n.39 (2015).
Claims against the United States seeking monetary damages less than $10,000 may be brought in
any federal district court, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2012), but takings claims in that amount are
rarely brought.
63. 552 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
64. 42 Fed. Cl. 252 (1998).
65. 722 F.3d 1375.
66. The Federal Circuit has not heard a takings claim related to Category Two—property
damage resulting from a controlled burn set to mitigate fire risk. Tort claims have been brought
against the United States in such circumstances alleging that the government negligently carried
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old paradigm cases and the new paradigm case, the courts focused on the
particulars of the government action at issue, rather than the general nature
of the wildland subject to the fire.
In Cary v. United States, 67 the Federal Circuit addressed a Category
One case. The plaintiffs’ land was burned after a lost hunter deployed a
signal flare that ignited a wildfire.68 The plaintiffs alleged that Forest
Service management practices had increased the risk of a high-intensity fire
like the one that damaged the plaintiffs’ property, and therefore the
plaintiffs should receive compensation from the federal government. 69 The
Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of the case holding that the plaintiffs had
failed to properly allege that the fire that burned their property was the
“direct, natural, or probable” result of the Forest Service’s management
activities, but instead had only alleged that those management activities
increased the risk of a fire within the forest.70 As the court explained, no
single management decision had set the fire in motion, but rather the Forest
Service had engaged in “a long sequence of decisions, some risk-increasing
but others risk-decreasing, spread out over decades.” 71 The court also
concluded that the plaintiffs’ claim failed because the wildfire that damaged
their property appropriated no benefit to the government, and, in fact, the
government’s interests were also harmed by the fire.72
In Teegarden v. United States, 73 the Court of Federal Claims addressed
a Category Three case. The Uinta Flat Fire ignited on July 15, 1989, and
rapidly grew in size. 74 In fighting the fire, the Forest Service issued a
directive to firefighting personnel prioritizing the protection of “life and
property,” including “summer home[s],” and areas of “high commercial
timber values.” 75 The plaintiffs owned properties that fell into neither
category, and the fire spread to their property. 76 The court entered
summary judgment for the United States, explaining that while the Forest
Service’s prioritization may have resulted in the fire spreading to plaintiffs’
out a controlled burn. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 55 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1995).
Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Anderson did not address the discretionary function
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (“FTCA”) waiver of sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. §
2680(a) (2012). In Green v. United States, however, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
discretionary function exception did not apply in certain circumstances involving controlled burns.
630 F.3d 1245 (9th Cir. 2011).
67. 552 F.3d 1373.
68. Id. at 1375.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1378.
71. Id. at 1379.
72. Id. at 1380.
73. 42 Fed. Cl. 252 (1998).
74. Id. at 253.
75. Id. at 254.
76. Id.
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land, the Forest Service did not intend to take the plaintiff’s property. 77
Instead, the Forest Service utilized the limited resources it had to protect as
much property as possible. 78 The court further concluded that the Forest
Service’s actions were not the legal cause of any property damage because
the “plaintiffs cannot escape the incontrovertible fact that the Uinta Flat
Fire, not the Forest Service, caused the destruction of their property.” 79
Unlike in Cary, the court here disposed of the case at summary judgment,
although the court’s causation analysis would seem to lend itself to a
relatively easy and early resolution of the case in the government’s favor.
In TrinCo Investment Co. v. United States, 80 the Federal Circuit
addressed a case falling into Category Four and reversed a district court
order granting a motion to dismiss in favor of the government. As part of
an effort to fight the Iron Complex fire, the Forest Service lit backfires
adjacent to and on the plaintiffs’ property. 81 The Court of Federal Claims
dismissed the case finding that the Forest Service’s action was justified
under the doctrine of public necessity because the action was part of the
Forest Service’s efforts to fight the Iron Complex fire.82 The Federal
Circuit explained that the doctrine of public necessity could insulate the
government from liability. 83 It held, however, that Court of Federal Claims
erred in resolving the issue at the motion to dismiss stage because the
government could only properly invoke the public necessity defense if
igniting the backfire in such a way as to damage the plaintiffs’ properties
was necessary to address an actual emergency. 84 Making that determination
required facts outside the complaint.85 As the court explained: “It is
certainly plausible that the Iron Complex fire did not pose an imminent
danger or actual emergency necessitating the destruction of such a sizable
portion of TrinCo’s property.” 86 As a result, the court believed that there
were “legitimate questions as to imminence, necessity, and emergency,”

77. Id. at 257.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 722 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
81. Id. at 1377.
82. Id. at 1377–78; see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 196 (1965) (“One is privileged
to enter land in the possession of another if it is, or if the actor reasonably believes it to be,
necessary for the purpose of averting an imminent public disaster.”).
83. TrinCo Inv. Co., 722 F.3d at 1378.
84. Id. at 1380.
85. Id.
86. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court addressed a similar situation in Brewer v. State, 341 P.3d
1107 (Alaska 2014) (reversing a lower court’s decision that the doctrine of necessity required
dismissing a complaint brought by a property owner whose property had been damaged by a back
burn).
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each of which required factual development before the Court of Federal
Claims. 87
TrinCo can be viewed as a paradigm shift, replacing an approach to
wildfire takings claims that had allowed the government to successfully
prevail early in the life of a case with one that requires substantial factual
development. The new approach envisions a searching inquiry into the
government action, both in terms of precisely what steps the government
took, and also what knowledge government officials possessed in
establishing a course of action for fighting the wildfire. TrinCo also
appears to place the burden of proof on the government, requiring it to
prove that the precise action undertaken was necessary to respond to an
emergency, 88 while in both Cary and Teegarden the courts held that the
plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of establishing that the
governmental action constituted a taking in the first place. Alternatively,
TrinCo, despite its enhanced skepticism about governmental fire
management activities,89 can be read in harmony with Cary and Teegarden.
As Category One and Category Two cases, Cary and Teegarden addressed
situations where the government did not directly ignite the fire that harmed
private property. In other words, the government may still be able to
prevail with relative ease, so long as it can disclaim responsibility for
lighting the wildfire that burns private property.
III. RECONSIDERING WILDFIRE TAKINGS
Wildfire takings cases are likely to become increasingly frequent. The
(few) existing cases suggest that the Federal Circuit and Court of Federal
Claims are likely to take an incident-centric approach to such claims—
meaning that the courts will focus their analysis on the specific incident that
resulted in harm to private property, rather than the background wildfire
risk inherent in ownership of that property. In my view, this approach is
wrongheaded. This Section explains the problems with the incident-centric
approach and justifies the alternative, baseline-centric approach in terms of
both doctrine and practical consequence.

87. TrinCo Inv. Co., 722 F.3d at 1380.
88. Id. at 1380 (“The necessity defense is just what it says it is: a defense.”).
89. In the closing line of the opinion, the court states: “It would be a remarkable thing if the
Government is allowed to take a private citizen’s property without compensation if it could just as
easily solve the problem by taking its own.” Id. at 1380. While this statement may have a certain
common-sense appeal, it is entirely unclear how the government would go about demonstrating
that emergency response efforts fully considered actions that avoided harm to private property in
the face of a rapidly evolving situation.
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A. Problems with the Incident-Centric Approach
There are a number of problems with the current approach by which
courts focus their attention on the particular incident that caused damage to
private property, rather than the property’s baseline wildfire risk.
First, the incident-centric approach arbitrarily distinguishes between
owners that have suffered identical harms, preferencing the claims of those
whose property is coincidentally damaged by a fire ignited by the
government, rather than those whose property is damaged by a fire ignited
either naturally or by non-governmental actors. 90 On one hand, the
plaintiffs in TrinCo may be able to recover compensation from the
government, and will likely force the government to expend significant
resources in discovery, because the Forest Service ignited backfires on their
land before an existing wildfire could reach them. The plaintiffs in Cary,
on the other hand, may not be able to recover because a wayward hunter,
and not the government, ignited the blaze. In cases like Cary, a court could
conceivably conclude that the government involvement on the wildland had
been the direct cause of the wildfire, even if the government itself had not
caused the ignition. In both cases, private property was damaged when
publicly owned forests burned, but the former plaintiff has a much greater
likelihood of securing compensation.
Second, the current approach—in particular the current approach to the
necessity doctrine—appears to improperly import notions of fault into
takings jurisprudence.
Takings doctrine should identify those
circumstances where governmental action is “functionally equivalent to the
classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or
ousts the owner from his domain.” 91 Such inquiry presupposes the
legitimacy of governmental action and focuses on the burden experienced
by the landowner, rather than the carelessness of the government. A claim
that the government has acted carelessly should sound in tort, not in
takings, and the Federal Circuit’s approach to the public necessity doctrine
would stand this proposition on its head. 92
Third, the current approach creates disincentives for sensible forest
management practices to reduce wildfire risk. More than one billion acres
90. In other contexts, takings law does draw arbitrary lines between those who may secure
compensation from the government and those that may not. See Pidot, supra note 12, at 157. In
the context of wildfire takings claims, however, the experience of the owner whose land is burned
by a naturally occurring fire and the owner whose land is burned by a government-ignited fire is
virtually identical and courts should hesitate before developing rules that treat the two parties
differently without adequate justification.
91. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
92. Courts should be particularly wary of incorporating analysis of the appropriateness of
governmental action into takings doctrine. Through the so-called substantially advanced test in
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) the Supreme Court attempted to adopt this
approach, which the Court had unanimously repudiated in Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540–41.
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of wildlands are subject to enhanced wildfire risk because of excessive
fuel. 93 Appropriate use of prescribed burns can mitigate this risk by
reducing fuel loads, and commentators have called upon government
agencies to substantially increase the use of prescribed burns.94 Agencies
already face substantial obstacles in implementing prescribed burns on a
large scale, in no small part because land management agency budgets are
already committed to funding firefighting activities, leaving little funding
available for wildfire mitigation.95 In addition, the existing environmental
law regulatory regime creates obstacles to prescribed burns. For example,
Kirsten Engel has persuasively argued that the Clean Air Act, as currently
implemented, creates perverse incentives that discourage prescribed burns,
despite the health effects of prescribed burns being better than those
associated with uncontrolled, cataclysmic wildfire. 96 The possibility of a
compensation remedy under the Takings Clause could further discourage
such sensible practices that would result in healthier ecosystems, less air
pollution, and less economic losses from wildfires. Despite their best
efforts, government agencies will on occasion lose control of prescribed
burns, and if courts were to require the government to pay compensation
under the Takings Clause in such eventualities, this could substantially
reduce the willingness of forest managers to engage in such activities.
Similarly, the liability rule envisioned by TrinCo may interfere with
wildfire fighting efforts. Governmental officials face formidable challenges
in containing wildfires. These efforts cost substantial government funds 97
and rapidly evolving conditions on the ground can jeopardize the lives of
firefighting personnel and individuals caught unaware.98 Emergency
personnel should not face the specter that every decision they make will be

93. See Kirsten H. Engel, Perverse Incentives: The Case of Wildfire Smoke Regulation, 40
ECOL. L.Q. 623, 627 (2013).
94. Id. (“An aggressive increase in the use of prescribed fire, together with other fuel
treatment methods, could reduce this risk [of wildfires].”).
95. See U.S. FOREST SERV. REPORT, supra note 37, at 3, 5.
96. See Engle, supra note 93, at 627–28. Engle describes the tension the regulatory climate
has created between resource agencies and air agencies, which is a dynamic that has impeded the
use of prescribed burns. Id. at 669. She also notes that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) discounts smoke from wildfires when it assesses compliance with ambient air quality
standards but not smoke from prescribed burns. Id. at 652–53. This occurs because wildfires are
deemed natural and prescribed burns human-caused. Id. at 651. Engle urges the EPA to repudiate
this policy and consider all smoke from wildfires as part of assuring air quality compliance. Id. at
664.
97. See U.S. FOREST SERV. REPORT, supra note 37, at 3, 5; GAO, IMPORTANT STEPS, supra
note 6.
98. Hailey Branson-Potts & Frank Shyong, President Obama Declares Major Disaster in
Deadly California Wildfire, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-ln-california-wildfires-20150922-story.html; Three Firefighters Killed, Four Injured Battling
Washington State Wildfire, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/threefirefighters-killed-battling-washington-state-wildfire-four-injured-364537.
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second-guessed by a judge in a proceeding seeking compensation from the
government. In coordinating a wildfire response, government personnel
must make rapid strategic decisions to ensure the safety of human life and
limit the damage caused by wildfires.99 They should not also be thinking
about ensuring that they have an adequate record to demonstrate that their
actions fall within the public necessity defense. Existing case law also
suggests that takings liability will generally not exist when the government
fails to protect property from wildfire, but affirmative fire response efforts
could create liability. In other words, when the government attempts to
protect lives and property by actively fighting wildfires, it exposes itself to
potential liability that would not exist if the government took no action.
This serves as a disincentive for government to take action at all. While
other incentives—both political and humanitarian—will likely result in
governmental actors continuing to intervene in many circumstances,
distorting emergency response in a fashion that encourages inaction (in the
absence of demonstrated benefits of such inaction) is counterproductive.100
Fourth, and most importantly from my perspective, a compensation
rule functions as a subsidy for ownership and development of private
property in wildfire-prone ecosystems. This subsidy would augment
existing subsidies that encourage unwise and inefficient development and
redevelopment, placing increasing numbers of people and amounts of
infrastructure in harm’s way. 101 Such subsidies are particularly troubling
because they reinforce cognitive distortions that cause individuals to
undervalue natural disaster risks.
Others have recognized that subsidizing development in areas prone to
wildfire is bad policy and increases the vulnerability of people and the built
environment. Two student Notes have recently taken up the topic in
significant detail. Garrett Trego has suggested creation of programs by
99. My view that firefighters should make decisions without worrying about the potential for
triggering governmental liability is at odds with that expressed by Susan Kuo, who favors liability
rules as a means of avoiding inefficient wildfire suppression techniques. See Susan S. Kuo,
Disaster Tradeoffs: The Doubtful Case for Public Necessity, 54 B.C. L. REV. 127, 128 (2013).
Kuo argues that the government should be liable for losses property owners incur during the
government’s disaster response activities because otherwise private property owners are being
asked to subsidize—by absorbing losses—governmental provision of disaster protection, which
she views as a public good. Id. at 129–30. In my view, Kuo’s argument ignores that private
property owners in wildfire-prone ecosystems receive substantial subsidies themselves and
providing a compensation remedy merely enhances those subsidies.
100. This is not to say that scholars and government officials should not carefully examine
wildfire response efforts for their effectiveness, efficiency, and ecological consequence. See, e.g.,
Karen M. Bradshaw, Backfired! Distorted Incentives in Wildfire Suppression Techniques, 31
UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 156 (2011). Formulating better policies to shape wildfire response is
an important task. But such evaluation should be done retrospectively. Attaching financial
penalties to certain wildfire suppression techniques because they require affirmative governmental
action would not appear to lead to more ecologically or economically sound practices.
101. See Reilly, supra note 6, at 554–58; Pidot, supra note 5, at 245–50.
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federal, state, or local governments to address wildfires that would be
funded by special assessments imposed on property owners within the
WUI. 102 Benjamin Reilly has suggested that the federal government should
attempt to shift the costs of wildfires to property owners through a federal
insurance scheme. 103 Whatever the appropriate response to dealing with the
perverse incentives created by existing subsidies, we should avoid
expanding those subsidies and thereby further increasing vulnerability,
something which would result in robust wildfire takings claims.
B. An Alternative Path
Another path exists. Rather than focusing on the specific fire that
damaged private property, courts could consider the baseline fire risk facing
that property. Wildlands naturally burn and infrastructure within their
borders will naturally be damaged or destroyed, with or without
government intervention. Those who make decisions to purchase and
develop property within such wildlands do so knowing of this possibility.
In such circumstances, the government should not have to compensate the
owners of property damaged by a predictable natural hazard.
I would suggest, then, that courts should recognize a categorical limit
to wildfire takings liability, but it should not arise from analysis of a
particular governmental action that may have caused or contributed to the
damage suffered by a property owner. Rather, compensation should not be
awarded under the Takings Clause when wildfires occur in fire-prone
wildlands. 104
Such a categorical approach recognizes that certain natural hazards
essentially adhere to property ownership. The Supreme Court has
recognized that background legal principles attach to title such that
operation of one of those principles can never support a takings claim, even
if the property has lost all value.105 Similarly, background ecological
principles—such as wildfire risk—should be viewed as attaching to
property, and when property experiences a manifestation of those
background ecological principles, takings claims should be barred.
Several aspects of takings doctrine support such a categorical rule.
The reasonable expectations of property owners have always been a
102. Trego, supra note 6, at 617–22.
103. See Reilly, supra note 6, at 543, 560. In light of the failure of the National Flood
Insurance Program to achieve actuarially sound insurance rates, see, e.g., Pidot, supra note 5, at
255–56, I am pessimistic that a federal insurance program would accurately price risk.
104. Other remedies may be available. If government employees act negligently, for example,
property owners could file tort suits. See Anderson v. United States, 55 F.3d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir.
1995). Such lawsuits may face challenges due to the limited waiver of sovereign immunity
embodied in the FTCA, but concern about the extent to which the government has provided for
tort lawsuits should not be a reason to recognize a more expansive takings remedy.
105. See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
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cornerstone of takings liability. 106 Those choosing to develop within
wildfire-prone wildlands do not have a reasonable expectation that wildfire
will not visit their property, and without such a reasonable expectation,
takings claims should fail. The Supreme Court’s treatment of the takings
claims at issue in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States107
supports this view that a property owner’s reasonable expectations, and
therefore their ability to secure compensation from the government, are
connected to the naturally occurring risks facing the property. 108 In that
case, a property owner—an agency of the state of Arkansas—sought
compensation from the United States when the Army Corps of Engineers’
management of a dam led to flooding downstream. 109 During oral
argument, Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Sotomayor all asked questions
related to trying to identify what baseline should be used to determine
whether the flooding at issue could be attributed to the government. 110
Toward the end of the argument, Justice Sotomayor posed the question
most precisely, asking: “Is the baseline . . . before the dam or after the dam,
and why is it one or the other? If flooding was going to occur more
unpredictably before the dam, and possibly summer flooding of this kind
could have happened, do you lose?” 111
The Court’s ultimate decision in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission
also addressed in passing the baseline issue. The Court explained that the
property at issue “had not been exposed to flooding comparable [to that at
issue in the case] in any other time span either prior to or after the
construction of the Dam.” 112 This statement suggests that had the flooded
property been subject to historical floods of the character at issue in the
case, the property owner may not have had a reasonable expectation that
flooding would not recur, and therefore the takings claim would have failed.
The general concept of reciprocity of advantage also supports the rule I
suggest. 113 This concept, which suggests that property owners should not

106. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001); Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
107. 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
108. Id. at 522.
109. Id. at 515–16.
110. For example, Justice Kennedy stated: “[W]hat I want is the definition of the operable
baseline that we can use in order to define whether or not there has been a taking,” and Justice
Alito asked: “Should the baseline be what would have happened if the dam was never built?”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511
(2012) (No. 11-597). Later in the argument, Justice Sotomayor returned to the issue, asking, “tell
me what the baseline is.” Id. at 34.
111. Id. at 54.
112. Ark. Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 522.
113. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see also Andrew W. Schwartz,
Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic Trend in Regulatory Takings, 22
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2004).
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be able to recover compensation from the government where the losses they
experience are offset by “the advantage of living and doing business in a
civilized community,” 114 is implicit in much of takings law. 115 The concept
has significant application to wildfire takings claims. The federal
government invests heavily in managing publicly owned wildlands and
responding to wildfires when they occur, spending billions of dollars a year
to fund these endeavors. 116 These efforts, while not always successful, cost
the taxpayer dearly and provide property owners with longer periods of
repose between episodes of wildfire than they would experience absent
government action, periods during which a property owner can enjoy
improvements on her property and recoup her investment. This valuable
benefit counterbalances losses suffered when wildfire eventually (and
inevitably) burns infrastructure within fire-prone wildlands. At such time,
property owners have no legitimate demand for payment from the
government because they have already been the recipient of substantial
government benefits.
Economic research about the effect of wildfires on property values
bolsters the case for reciprocity of advantage in this context.117 Even if
federal policies have resulted in less frequent, more severe wildfires, that
may be the type of event that enhances property value on the whole.
Evidence suggests that the negative effect of wildfire on property value
relates directly to frequency, 118 meaning that prolonged periods without
wildfire improve the situation of property owners vis-à-vis the market.
While a natural regime that includes frequent, low intensity fires may pose
less threat of direct harm to physical infrastructure, frequent fires would
appear likely to more significantly depress property values. Less frequent,
higher intensity wildfires would, on the other hand, result in greater risk of
harm to physical infrastructure, but property values would be less sensitive
to this risk except in the immediate aftermath of a wildfire.
Finally, causation principles favor a rule that bars compensation
claims. Where wildlands predictably burn as a result of their environmental
attributes, no particular fire should be viewed as causing injury. Rather,
114. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 422. As the California Supreme Court explained the concept:
[T]he necessary reciprocity of advantage lies not in a precise balance of burdens and
benefits accruing to property from a single law, or in an exact equality of burdens
among all property owners, but in the interlocking system of benefits, economic and
noneconomic, that all the participants in a democratic society may expect to receive,
each also being called upon from time to time to sacrifice some advantage, economic or
noneconomic, for the common good.
San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 109 (Cal. 2002).
115. See Schwartz, supra note 113, at 46–61.
116. See U.S. FOREST SERV. REPORT, supra note 37, at 3, 5; GAO, IMPORTANT STEPS, supra
note 6.
117. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
118. See Hansen et al., supra note 49.
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property faces a persistent risk of fire damage, and the decision to build in a
risky location should be viewed as the cause of the eventual injury. 119
There may, of course, be wildfire that occurs in a location that did not
experience historical fire cycles. In such circumstances, an examination of
the governmental action and its justifications may be warranted. But such
circumstances are likely to be rare. While only three cases, it is notable that
Cary, Teegarden, and TrinCo all occurred within western wildlands that
experienced recurring wildfires in their natural state.
Disallowing takings recovery for property owners that choose to
develop in hazard-prone areas also allows market signals to more accurately
price risk. This, in turn, facilitates better, more rational, and more socially
optimal development decisions. Because development in hazard-prone
areas imposes costs on the public and consumes scarce natural resources,
the takings rule suggested in this Essay has both a sound doctrinal basis and
serves important public policy goals.
IV. CONCLUSION
The destruction caused by wildfires has become a ubiquitous
component of the news cycle. 120 More people live in wildfire-prone
wildlands, and climate change and a buildup of fuels results in more
frequent and more intense wildfires. Each year taxpayers spend more
money to fight wildfires. And this trend is likely to continue. At the same
time, we can expect to see more lawsuits filed against the federal
government (and perhaps state and local governments too) seeking
compensation when wildfires damage private property. That likelihood is
partially a numbers game—more people experiencing more harm will lead
to more lawsuits—and partially a feature of a paradigm shift that may be
represented by the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in TrinCo.
Rather than taking an incident-centric approach to wildfire takings
claims, courts would do better to take baseline natural conditions seriously.
Where private property is naturally subject to wildfire risk, claims for
compensation should be barred when that risk materializes and wildfire
damages the property. Such a rule has numerous salutary effects. Perhaps
its most significant effect, however, is that categorically barring such claims
avoids the creation of another subsidy for developing in wildfire-prone
ecosystems.
119. As Phil O’Keefe and his colleagues explained in a seminal article about natural disasters:
“Without people there is no disaster.” Phil O’Keefe et al., Taking the Naturalness out of Natural
Disasters, 260 NATURE 566, 566 (1976). Similarly, when wildfires damage private property, the
cause, at least in part, is the decision of the owner to build in a risky location.
120. See, e.g., John Schwartz, As Fires Grow, a New Landscape Appears in the West, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/science/as-fires-grow-a-newlandscape-appears-in-the-west.html?_r=0.

2016]

NATURAL BASELINES FOR WILDFIRE TAKINGS CLAIMS

721

A baseline-centric approach to wildfire takings claims will mean that
most property owners will have no claim for compensation against the
government. That outcome reflects that those who purchase and develop
property within wildfire-prone ecosystems do so despite the wildfire risk
facing such property. This does not, of course, mean that no property
owner may ever recover under any legal theory. Under the right
circumstances, where the government has acted carelessly, a property
owner could conceivably bring suit under state tort law. Such lawsuits will
be difficult to win because of limitations inherent in bringing tort suits
against the government, but that difficulty does not justify distorting the law
of takings.

